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Abstract
In recent years, outsourcing has gained considerable management attention. However,
the benefits of outsourcing are not without concessions. One major risk is losing the
flexibility to change the extent, nature, or scope of the outsourced business services, and
such flexibility is strategically imperative in today’s dynamic business environment. This
paper seeks to clarify the multi-dimensional notion of flexibility in outsourcing by
examining robustness, modifiability, new capability, and ease of exit. Adapting from
Evans (1991), we also develop a framework to classify existing practices in managing
outsourcing flexibility. We go beyond contractual provision to surface a portfolio of
pre-emptive, protective, exploitive, and corrective maneuvers. These strategic
maneuvers map well to traditional notions in coordination theory, both in advanced
structuring through loose coupling and dependency diversification, and in dynamic
adjustment through proactive sensing and reactive adapting. We put forward a set of
propositions hypothesizing the relationships between the various strategic maneuvers
and the different dimensions of outsourcing flexibility, and discuss the moderating impact
of such maneuvers on outsourcing success. We hope the greater conceptual clarity will
not only contribute to the effectiveness of outsourcing management but also spawn a
new research agenda on outsourcing flexibility.
Key words: flexibility, outsourcing, coordination theory, outsourcing success
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Introduction
Outsourcing has gained considerable management attention since the 1980s.
Traditionally, many non-core, information technology (IT) activities, such as desktop
support, call centers, network operations, and application development have been
relegated to external service vendors (see Cross, 1995; Clark et al., 1995; Lee et al.,
2003). Recent years have seen burgeoning business process outsourcing (BPO), which
involves farming out non-core yet mission-critical business processes such as finance
and accounting, human resources, and customer support to third-party service providers,
often in offshore locations (Linder, 2004). IT largely enables the provision of such
services, through web-based interfaces, extensive application support with commercial
package software, such as SAP, and reliable network connections. With the promise of
reduced cost, improved time to delivery, process streamlining, and strategic repositioning,
many organizations have jumped onto the outsourcing bandwagon (Ang and Cummings,
1997). British Petroleum’s outsourcing of finance and accounting to Accenture, for
example, helped to speed up its post-merger integration of Amoco and Arco. Forecasts
by the Gartner Group project strong growth in worldwide outsourcing spending. The IT
outsourcing market continues to rise and is expected to hit $260 billion in 2009. Similarly,
the current BPO market is estimated to climb from $111.3 billion in 2004 to $172 billion in
2009, growing at a per-annum rate of close to 10%.
However, the benefits of outsourcing are not without concessions. One major issue is the
loss of flexibility, the ability to change the extent, nature, or scope of the business
services that outsourcing delivers. Such flexibility in an outsourcing relationship is crucial
to respond to uncertainty or to changing needs or requirements outside the provisions of
the original outsourcing agreement. This is particularly pertinent in today’s competitive
and dynamic environment, as flexibility is increasingly becoming a strategic imperative for
business survival (Suarez et al., 1995).
Traditionally, outsourcing flexibility is managed primarily through careful contracting, as
management is often advised to craft short-term, airtight contracts to control for
anticipated changes (Lacity, Willcocks, and Feeny, 1995; Fitzgerald and Willcocks, 1994;
Saunder et al., 1997). Much of the literature dealing with flexibility in outsourcing
arrangements emphasizes careful upfront contractual provisions. Harris et al. (1998)
refer to the notion of contractual flexibility, the extent to which a contract contains bilateral
adjustment mechanisms that allow ongoing adaptation to changing circumstances. Such
a contract is typically characterized by variable pricing, short contract duration, modular
contract structure, 2 a renegotiation or arbitration clause, premature termination
conditions, and innovation incentives (see Table 1). Successfully negotiating more
comprehensive flexibility provisions in such contracts should enhance outsourcing
flexibility (Harrigan and Newman, 1990; Michell and Fitzgerald, 1997; Harris et al., 1998).
However, given the static nature of contracts, there are limitations to using them as the
sole means to achieve flexibility. This is partly due to the problem of incomplete
contracting (Richmond et al., 1992), the inability to anticipate all changing conditions due
to bounded rationality. In a constantly evolving environment, the cost of creating
contracts with complete contingencies is prohibitively high, if not impossible. Consulting
2

Dividing major contract terms into separate components such that changes in one part will not
affect the others, and demand less time and effort for ongoing adjustments.
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Table 1. Flexible Contractual Provision in Outsourcing
Contractual
Clause
Description
provision
Original contract price may be changed through
(de)escalation mechanism (benchmarking, indexing, open
pricing, etc.).
Renegotiation clause enables some aspects of the contract
Renegotiation
to be changed during the life of the contract.
Contract
The parties may opt for a short or long contract. Shorter
Adjustment
duration
contracts are more flexible.
mechanisms
Early
A clause permitting premature termination of the contract,
termination
usually triggered by prescribed situations.
Dispute
In case of dispute, parties may resort to arbitration or
resolution
litigation. Arbitration is more flexible.
Incentive
Links vendor payment to performance of the organization; is
contracting
conducive to flexibility.
Modular contract comprises a constellation of components
Modular
Separated
(SLAs, strategic objective statements, continuous
contract
contract terms
improvement mechanisms) affixed to a standard set of
structure
“master terms and conditions.”
Note: Adapted from Harris et al. 1998
Pricing

reports have typically shown that contract drafting and negotiations take up considerable
portions of the time and effort invested in outsourcing. Even then, their effectiveness is
questionable, as the terms and conditions of a typical 5-to-10-year outsourcing contract
often cannot respond to a dynamic business environment. As Barthelemy (2001) and
Lacity and Willcocks (2001) show, many outsourcing arrangements have to be
renegotiated because they cannot accommodate environmental uncertainty. Kern and
Willcocks (2000) estimate that one in eight outsourcing deals is prematurely terminated.
Other scholars have also blamed rigid contracts as a primary reason that many
outsourcing efforts fail (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993; Peisch, 1995; Lacity and
Willcocks,1998). A well-crafted contract can only address the foreseeable flexibility
required at the point of contracting but not the unanticipated business dynamism that
emerges subsequently (see Figure 1).
The issue is even more crucial in the context of BPOs, as such arrangements carry a
great deal more complexity and uncertainty. These business processes are often critical
and tightly coupled with other organizational processes. Their complexity arises from the
simultaneous outsourcing of technological, workflow, and human resources.
Idiosyncrasies in business processes also demand that a firm carefully balance a
customized process to meet specific organizational needs against a standardized
delivery process that, due to scale issues, makes vendors more efficient. In some cases,
outsourcing services offshore introduces greater management and coordination risks,
due to geographical dispersion and cultural differences. Managing outsourcing
successfully in today’s dynamic environment can thus be daunting (Feeny et al., 2003).
This paper investigates alternative strategies to managing outsourcing flexibility beyond
traditional contracting. Besides comprehensive flexibility provisions in contracts, are there
other mechanisms that organizations can deploy to enhance outsourcing flexibility? If so,
how do they contribute to different dimensions of flexibility?
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Environmental Uncertainty

Foreseeable
change

Foreseeable
change

Unforeseeable
change

Poorly-crafted contract
with no alternative
flexibility maneuvers

Foreseeable
change

Unforeseeable
change

Well-crafted contract
with no alternative flexibility
maneuvers

Unforeseeable
change

Well-crafted contract
with alternative flexibility
maneuvers

Figure 1. Contribution of Flexibility Maneuvers Beyond Careful Contracting
In the following sections, we clarify the multi-dimensional notion of flexibility in
outsourcing. We then introduce the conceptual framework proposed by Evans (1991),
and elaborate on it in light of coordination theory (March and Simon, 1958; Gosain et al.,
2004) to surface a portfolio of strategic maneuvers to manage outsourcing flexibility. We
also map managerial practices from the outsourcing literature onto the conceptual
framework in order to hypothesize about the relationships between these strategic
maneuvers and flexibility. Finally, we discuss how outsourcing flexibility moderates the
negative relationship between environmental uncertainty and outsourcing success before
concluding with implications for theory and practice. We hope that greater conceptual
clarity will not only contribute to more effective outsourcing management, but also spawn
a new research agenda on outsourcing flexibility.

Flexibility Overview
Flexibility is a key management concept, and has been extensively studied in different
academic disciplines, such as strategic management (Sanchez, 1995; Volberda, 1996;
Zaheer and Zaheer, 1997), manufacturing (Sethi and Sethi, 1990; Upton, 1994), and
information systems (Avison et al., 1995; Eardley et al., 1997). Table 2 summarizes the
key literature in these domains. Specifically, we rely on the synthesis of flexibility
literature3 by Bahrami and Evans (2004) who have distilled these proliferated notions of
flexibility into three key dimensions – robustness, modifiability, and new capability. We
believe these dimensions are equally fitting in the outsourcing context. Given the
inter-organizational context of outsourcing, we have also included a fourth dimension,
ease of exit, to account for the inflexibility of being locked into a relationship
3

Bahrami and Evans’s (2004) review is broad and covers disciplines such as military strategy,
economics, manufacturing and operations management, strategic management, finance,
information systems, and organizational science.
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Table 2. Conceptualizations of Flexibility in Multiple Domains
Flexibility
dimensions

Information Systems
System robustness
(Rosenhead et al. 1986)

Infrastructure flexibility
(Duncan 1995; Byrd and Turner
2000; Weill et al. 2002)

Open system (Allen and
Boynton 1991; Chau and Tam
1997)


Robustness

Technology flexibility (Brown
and Hagel 2003; Prager 1996)

Software reusability
(Nidumolu and Knotts 1998)


Modifiability

Software development
flexibility (Nelson and Cooprider
2001)


New capability

Inter-organizational system
flexibility (Venkatraman 1994;
Clark et al. 1995; Harrison 1994)


Ease of exit

Manufacturing
Equipment flexibility (Parker
and Wirth 1999)

Material flexibility (Jordan and
Graves 1995; Carlsson 1989)

Volume flexibility (Jack and
Raturi 2002)

Delivery flexibility (Sethi and
Sethi 1990)

Program flexibility (Upton 1994)

Mixed flexibility (Jack and
Raturi 2002; Suarez et al. 1995)

Rerouting flexibility (Upton
1994)

Changeover flexibility (Koste
and Malhotra1999)

Process flexibility (Graves and
Tomlin 2003)

New product development
flexibility (Gupta and Goyal 1989;
Sieger et al. 2000)


Market flexibility (Gerwin 1993,
Sethi and Sethi 1990)

Partnering flexibility (Gosain et
al. 2004)


Strategic Management
Operational flexibility (DeGroote
1994; Tushman and Anderson 1986)


Tactical flexibility (Carlsson
1989)

Resource flexibility (Sanchez
1995; Gargiulo and Benassi 2000)


Strategic agility/flexibility
(Volberda 1996, Worren et al. 2002;
Eppink 1978)

Dynamic capability (Teece et al.,
1997)

Partnership adaptability
(Venkatraman and Henderson 1998;
Zaheer and Zaheer 1997)

Exit flexibility (Ybarra and
Wiersema 1999; Harrigan and
Newman 1990)
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Bahrami and Evans (2004) note that to be truly flexible, an organization needs to
embrace different dimensions of flexibility simultaneously—they term it “super-flexibility”
(p. 19). The first dimension of flexibility is robustness, the ability to endure variations and
perturbations, withstand pressure, or tolerate external changes. This relates to situations
in which an organization (with its organic and physical components) has the built-in
capacity to address uncertainty for varying levels of demand, product mix, and resource
availability (Carlsson, 1989). As managers foresee changes, they can consciously build
flexible mechanisms into the organization to address them, such as flexible
manufacturing systems with a wide range of parameters or pre-programmed operations
that accommodate daily fluctuations in production (Sethi and Sethi, 1990).
The second dimension of flexibility is modifiability, the ability of an organization to make
modifications (e.g., to adjust existing product attributes or alter service composition) to
cope with less foreseeable events when they occur. In contrast to robustness,
modification requires incremental but essential changes to the existing organization, such
as altering existing business rules without major setup efforts (Jordan and Graves, 1995).
The third dimension of flexibility, according to Bahrami and Evans (2004), addresses
radical changes in the business environment that deviate substantially from projections.
New capability is the ability to innovate in response to dramatic changes or novel
situations. Such a “competence-destroying” discontinuity (Tushman and Anderson, 1986)
may stem from competitors’ actions, changing consumer preferences, technological
innovations, or new regulations and laws. Responding to such discontinuity involves
radically transforming the existing organization to redefine a posture in the light of new
imperatives, or to proactively create a new state of affairs (Sambamurthy et al., 2003;
Venkatraman and Henderson, 1998), such as when a firm engages in developing new
products when existing knowledge is no longer relevant.
Although Bahrami and Evans (2004) discuss their conceptualization in the context of
organizational flexibility, we believe the three dimensions of flexibility also apply in an
outsourcing relationship. Outsourcing is an arrangement between firms where one
supplies a set of business services to the other. Elements of such an arrangement
include the business process – with its architectural design, established business rules
and resource deployment (human, technical, organizational)—as well as the related
formal and informal governance structures supporting the relationship. Inflexibility in the
business services delivered through outsourcing can arise from both rigid processes (e.g.,
strict adherence to pre-defined procedures as a business process is designed and
managed by the vendor) and rigid governance structures (e.g., a 10-year contract without
provision for pricing or service level amendments).
To cope with the dynamic environment, an outsourcing relationship should be capable of
change or adaptation. Outsourcing flexibility is thus about the ability of an outsourcing
relationship to change the extent, nature, or scope of business services delivered
(adapted from definitions in prior literature, e.g., Sanchez, 1995; Carlsson, 1989; and
Volberda, 1998). Often, it requires managing new and additional service requests beyond
the initial contractual baseline, which could mean changes to the processes (e.g.,
alteration of business rules and addition of new functionality), the governance structures
(e.g., contract renegotiation and vendor replacement), or some combination of these
elements. As Lacity and Willcocks (2001) point out, three triggers often require
adjustment or renegotiation in outsourcing: exceeding projected volume on existing
services; changing the nature or composition of baseline services; and demanding
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entirely new services. An outsourcing arrangement needs to build in sufficient capacity to
tolerate, absorb, or endure transactional variation, without significant modification or
re-deployment of resources. As organizational needs change, requests for changes in
service composition make an existing outsourcing arrangement susceptible to
modification. When a new set of business conditions arises altogether, an outsourcing
arrangement should also be able to provide a new service capability. For example,
midway through its outsourcing deal with EDS, the U.K. Inland Revenue was pressured
by Parliament to implement a self-assessment tax scheme. It was the largest single tax
reform of U.K. tax administration, and required an entirely new set of supporting functions
from EDS (Lacity and Willcocks, 2001).
Conceptualizing flexibility as robustness, modifiability, and new capability thus helps us
clarify the different dimensions of flexibility in outsourcing. However, these notions relate
to an existing relationship with an outsourcing vendor, which in itself could emerge as a
flexibility issue (e.g., the possibility of being locked in). Changing the extent, nature, and
scope of the outsourced business services may sometimes require the service provision
to be transferred to other vendors or to be brought in-house, especially if such changes
cannot be accommodated by the existing vendor. Hence, we include a fourth dimension
of outsourcing flexibility to account for its inter-organizational context: ease of exit. This
is the ability of an outsourcing relationship to allow transfer of services to other vendors or
to be brought in house (Venkatraman and Henderson, 1998; Ybarra and Wiersema,
2003). Gosain et al. (2004) term this ease of exit “partnering flexibility.” It differs from
response to a volume spike, service feature alteration, or new functionality, as it requires
assessing new vendors and re-building a new outsourcing relationship, and even
re-establishing in-house capability.
We believe that combining the four dimensions provides a holistic view of flexibility in
outsourcing. Ideally, organizations want to manage an outsourcing arrangement to
achieve high degrees of robustness, modifiability, readiness for new capability, and ease
of exit. Depending on the situational business dynamism, managers need to enact and
use different dimensions of flexibility. Table 3 summarizes these dimensions of
outsourcing flexibility.

Maneuvering for Flexibility: A Conceptual Framework
In his field research on high-technology firms, Evans (1991) develops a conceptual
framework encapsulating the strategic maneuvers to achieve flexibility. He proposes an
archetypal framework based on the temporal and intentional orientations. The maneuvers
can vary in “time,” as ex ante or ex post options. This suggests that flexibility can be
planned and managed in advance, or it can be adjusted after a contract is sealed
(Carlsson, 1989). The maneuvers can differ in their “intent,” or the degree to which
organizations take an offensive or defensive stance toward flexibility (i.e., proactively
creating and seizing an initiative, or defensively guarding against predatory moves).
Offensive maneuvers attempt to control changes in the environment to gain competitive
advantage, while defensive maneuvers strive to minimize the impacts of those changes.
Such attempts to manage flexibility have also been described as active or passive
(Eppink, 1978; Volberda, 1998).
The conjunction of these two distinct yet interwoven orientations produces four archetypal
maneuvers, which Evans (1991) categorizes as “pre-emptive,” “protective,” “exploitive,”
and “corrective” (see Figure 2).
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Table 3. Dimensions of Flexibility in Outsourcing
Flexibility
Meaning in
Description
Dimension outsourcing
Variability of
service
capacity

The ability of an outsourcing relationship to allow operational
changes exceeding projected capacity on existing service
delivery, i.e., service volume fluctuation, variations in
standard user requests, urgent or special case processing,
and exception handling

Alternation of
service
attributes

The ability of an outsourcing relationship to allow alternation
of attributes of its existing services in addressing changing
business requirements, e.g., new configuration setup,
alternation of processing workflow or business rules, new
reporting requirements, and reference data updates.

New
capability

Addition of
innovative
capability

The ability of an outsourcing relationship to allow the addition
of entirely new services to address radical changes or shifts
in business paradigms, e.g., new government regulations,
technological revamps, functional breakthroughs, and
process innovations.

Ease of exit

Switch to
another vendor
or in-sourcing

Robustness

Modifiability

The ability of an outsourcing relationship to allow transfer of
services to other vendors, or to be brought in-house, e.g.,
premature termination, vendor instability, or pricing
disagreement or dispute.

Coordination Theory
Offensive

Advanced Structuring

Dynamic Adaptation

Preemptive

Exploitive

Loose Coupling

Proactive Sensing
Outsourcing
Contracting

Before

Protective

After

Corrective

Dependency
Diversification

Relationship
Building
Defensive

Figure 2. Theoretical Foundation Behind Flexibility Maneuvers
Organizations can equip themselves with the dexterity required for pre-emptive
maneuvers before the nature of the contingency is known, consciously creating a range
of options before they are needed (Rosenhead et al., 1986). Organizations can also use
redundancy mechanisms, such as insurance or resource buffers, as a protective
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measure to guard against a potentially damaging situation and to allow a strategy to
remain viable in spite of changes in the environment. Ex post managerial capability to
exploit or capitalize on unexpected opportunities through constant scanning of the
business horizon, and the ability to recover from infliction and ameliorate the impacts of
accidents and mistakes are also critical to flexibility.
The framework is probably more empirically driven, as Evans himself (1991, p.76)
acknowledges, but the insights are consistent with the theoretical arguments in
coordination theory (March and Simon, 1958; Gosain et al., 2004). Outsourcing can be
seen as a complex coordination problem, requiring the management of an aggregation of
diverse activities, resources, and systems (Malone and Crowston, 1994). In such
situations of interdependence, concerted actions come about through coordination.
Organizations seek to consciously lay out prescribed activities by planning in advance,
but meanwhile, they supplement these with spontaneous ongoing adjustment to cope
with unforeseen scenarios (Beekun and Glick, 2001). Coordination may thus be based on
advanced structuring, or coordination by plan, and dynamic adjustment, or coordination
by feedback.
Advanced structuring can involve either reducing task interdependence through loose
coupling, or mitigating resource dependency by diversifying resource allocations (March
and Simon, 1958). Loose coupling reduces the need to coordinate information exchange
and flow in a dyadic relationship, while dependency diversification generates alternative
options to mitigate overdependence on critical resources. Dynamic adjustment is
achieved by enhancing feedback in a changing environment through sensing and
adapting (Sambamurthy et al., 2003). It can be seen as a two-pole strategy. In sensing
capability, through feedback, quick learning, and constant environmental
scanning—IT-supported or otherwise—organizations become more informed and
forward-looking, and have more time to adapt. In adaptive capability, organizations
emphasize proactive sensing less but seek ways to quickly react to or recover from
shocks. As we will discuss later, in outsourcing, the ability to build strong relationships
with vendors is central to quick adaptation.
Conceptually, the notions of advanced structuring and dynamic adjustment in
coordination theory align with the temporal orientation of Evans’ flexibility maneuvers,
corresponding to the difference between ex ante and ex post. In addition, the different
emphases on sensing and adapting map onto the offensive–defensive differentiation of
“intent” in Evans’ framework (Alexander, 1995). This integration of coordination theory
and Evans’ framework forms the basis of our research model, with coordination concepts
(loose coupling, dependency diversification, proactive sensing, and reactive adapting)
forming the key themes for pre-emptive, protective, exploitive, and corrective maneuvers,
respectively (see Figure 2).

Strategic Maneuvers for Flexibility
Loose Coupling as a Pre-Emptive Maneuver
Loose coupling is a dialectical concept that emphasizes the simultaneous existence of
rationality and indeterminacy in a system (Orton and Weick, 1990). Loose coupling
implies elements that are linked (coupled) to preserve some degree of determinacy. At
the same time, these elements are subject to spontaneous change, leading to some
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degree of independence (looseness). Loose coupling reduces interdependencies,
allowing task components to more easily deal with change. It also makes it easier for
them to disentangle and recombine into new configurations. Creating flexibility involves
structuring information and interface linkages to loosely couple interacting components
(Gosain et al., 2004; Beekun and Glick, 2001). A review of management practices with
strong theoretical foundations and empirical research in the outsourcing literature reveals
three strategic maneuvers that manifest such characteristics: minimizing customization,
enhancing process maturity, and leveraging vendors’ interoperability.
Minimizing Customization
The need to customize arises when there are non-trivial incompatibilities between a
vendor’s offerings and an organization’s idiosyncrasies. Some organizations have to
customize their vendors’ generic processes to fulfill their needs and differentiate
themselves (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995), resulting in
complex exchanges of information with vendors. Minimizing customization is important in
structuring the outsourcing relationships, as limited customization reduces the extent to
which market exchange is personalized, and limits the scope for moral hazard, shrinking,
and opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1985). Adhering to generic vendor offerings
allows for effective management of interdependencies, making the infrastructure more
capable of supporting change.
Heavy customization makes it difficult to use vendors’ generic capability, which is
perhaps ironically the reason why many processes are outsourced in the first place (Light,
2001). It also hinders an organization’s ability to leverage vendors’ production cost
advantages or common resources (Levina and Ross, 2003; Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999).
The customization issue is particularly pertinent considering the vendors’ general
reluctance to accede to individual organizational change requests. Lacity and Willcocks
(2001) highlight the outsourcing deal between British Aerospace (BAe) and Computer
Science Corporation (CSC), in which CSC was contractually prevented from
standardizing data centers and computing platforms to cater to the idiosyncratic service
requirements of each division of BAe. This customization hampered BAe’s ability to
respond quickly to external changes, as each new service request was subject to
excessive charges and delay.
Enhancing Process Maturity
Process maturity refers to the extent to which embedded knowledge in managing,
operating, and controlling a process has been captured or made explicit (Harter et al.,
2000). Reflecting the progressive notions of the capability maturity model in software
development (Paulk et al., 1993), McCormack and Johnson (2001) propose a process
maturity model representing a continuum of increasing maturity, from being “anecdotal,”
“planned and tracked,” “defined and measured,” “standardized and automated,” to
“continuously improved.” This model helps to assess how well management consciously
surfaces, rationalizes, and routinizes embedded knowledge in processes before
outsourcing them. The better the embedded knowledge of the processes is captured,
either through documentation or automated routines, the easier it is to transfer such
knowledge to other parties, and the faster a process can be modified or reconfigured to
respond to external changes. The best candidates for outsourcing are the processes at
the top of the maturity spectrum, as they are understood well enough to be standardized,
automated, or digitized to easily “plug and play” with other processes, or connect to
external partners (Tas and Sunder, 2004).
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Leveraging Vendor Interoperability
Interoperability represents the ability of IT infrastructure to match and adjust to multiple
operating needs (Chung et al., 2003). In outsourcing, the extent of interoperability is
primarily achieved in a vendor’s IT infrastructure, through high modularity, connectivity,
and compatibility (Byrd and Turner, 2000; Gosain et al., 2004). High interoperability is
often enabled by advanced integration technologies or adoption of industry standards,
such as relational databases and object-oriented technology, that minimizes component
interdependence, maximizes functional reusability, and enhances changeability
(Humphrey, 1989; Levina and Ross, 2003). Interoperable architectures create
information structures that are the “glue” holding together loosely coupled parts of
independent components. Open system architectures, such as PC-based plug-and-play
platforms, Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA), web services
(e.g., .NET), and extendable markup language, implement a suite of interface standards
to make software, hardware, and communications systems more compatible (Chau and
Tam, 1997). Such technologies are inherently “future proof,” enabling vendors to build,
modify, or apply IT quickly and appropriately in response to change (Prager, 1996;
Gabrani et al., 2003). Carefully selecting vendors with IT platforms based on modular and
scalable design and common compatibility and connectivity standards for high
interoperability should help to enhance outsourcing flexibility.

Dependency Diversification as a Protective Maneuver
While the above maneuvers are pre-emptive in facilitating future coordination in the
outsourcing relationship, more can be planned in advance as defensive maneuvers to
guard against potentially damaging consequences from unexpected variations. One
strategy is to avoid becoming overly dependent on other organizations (Alexander, 1995),
or to minimize dependency by maintaining alternative sources for services (Thompson,
1967). This strategy is a form of contingency planning and seeks to limit the damage
caused by unforeseen events by affording a choice of options that may be called upon
when necessary (Eardley et al., 1997). By the same token, Eppink (1978) invokes the
concept of “organizational slack” to buffer an organization from environmental
discontinuities. To this end, outsourcing organizations may diversify their dependency on
vendors by developing both external and internal alternatives, i.e., practicing multiple
sourcing and retaining in-house competence.
Practicing Multiple Sourcing
Organizations that provide scarce and critical resources acquire power in an exchange
relationship (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). As outsourced IT and business processes are
critical to most businesses, this is especially true of an outsourcing relationship (Kern and
Willcocks, 2000). When an organization relies too much on an outsourcing vendor, it is
likely to be locked into that relationship, giving the vendor little motivation to
accommodate unanticipated changes. Outsourcing to a single vendor may thus create
overdependence, limiting an organization’s choices in adverse situations (Currie and
Willcocks, 1998; Saunders et al., 1997). Engaging multiple outsourcing vendors avoids
depending too much on any single vendor.
Retaining In-House Competence
Gainey and Klass (2003) note that outsourcing can create significant flexibility pitfalls if
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internal technical skills are not maintained. Such buffers, or slack resources, may not be
cost efficient, but make perfect sense if dependency on a vendor needs to be mitigated.
Typically, the buffer consists of a team of in-house staff performing similar tasks, helping
an organization keep abreast of process knowledge and stay on top of changing
technology. The in-house competence is also important as back-up to cope with
unpredictable variations or to bring operations in-house if the vendor cannot
accommodate changes (Lacity et al., 1995). To balance cost benefits and business agility,
P&G continued to retain 10–15 “break-and-fix” IT people in its outsourcing deal with HP.

Proactive Sensing as an Exploitive Maneuver
Both pre-emptive and protective maneuvers to achieve flexibility require advanced
planning prior to outsourcing. Exploitive maneuvers, in contrast, are activated ex post,
and seek to help management learn as much as possible from diverse information
sources to make the best of an outsourcing arrangement. The proactive sensing
approach in dealing with change (Haeckel, 1999; Alexander, 1995) is consistent with
notions such as “alertness to opportunity” or “proactive learning” (Sambamurthy et al.,
2003; Miller, 1983). In searching for meaningful signals, managers systematically look for
early indications of new ideas, capabilities, or trends through environmental scanning and
regular communications with outsourcing vendors. Timely sensing allows organizations
to capitalize on such knowledge and adjust to changes quickly. Ideally, managers might
anticipate or even instigate change, rather than merely react to it. They can nurture
continuous innovation in outsourcing by exerting market pressure, or scanning the
competitive landscape of outsourcing vendors (e.g., benchmarking) to strengthen their
negotiating power. Organizations may also attempt to redefine market uncertainty by
championing and partnering with outsourcing vendors to develop new service capabilities
or technical advancements (Eardley et al., 1997).

Reactive Adaptation as a Corrective Maneuver
Enhancing reactive adaptation capacity in an outsourcing relationship is yet another
means of ex post dynamic adjustment. Central to such quick adaptation is the ability to
build relationships with vendors such that they are willing to align with organizations
whatever the dynamic changes are. Such relationships involve frequent communication
between organizational partners, development of shared goals, and cultivation of mutual
respect (Gittell, 2002; Gupta and Goyal, 1989). Grover et al. (1996) highlight notions such
as “relationship-specific assets” or “voluntary transactions,” i.e., organization and vendor
mutually and sequentially demonstrate their trustworthiness as the relationship evolves
(Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962). A strong partnership is an important vehicle for nourishing
flexibility when the need to respond to unexpected changes arises.
In light of coordination theory, Evan’s (1991) conceptual framework thus provides a basis
to consolidate the different maneuvers identified in the literature for managing
outsourcing flexibility. Extending the framework, we argue that the different maneuvers
contribute differently to the various dimensions of outsourcing flexibility: robustness,
modifiability, new capability, and ease of exit. We elaborate on this proposition in the
following sections.
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Development of Research Propositions
Pre-Emptive (Loose Coupling) Maneuvers and Outsourcing Flexibility
Coordination theory suggests that loose coupling allows interdependencies between and
within organizations to be managed more effectively in supporting change (March and
Simon, 1958; Gosain et al., 2004). For minimizing customization, this argument is
analogous to encouraging “plain vanilla” adoption of package software (e.g., ERP, CRM),
to reduce potential problems in future maintenance and upgrades (Holland et al., 1999).
Adhering to a vendor’s standard offerings enables an organization to leverage the
vendor’s economies of scale, as well as its scope for scalability and adaptability, thus
enhancing robustness. Minimal customization also simplifies the modification effort in an
outsourcing relationship. The vendor just needs to make necessary modifications based
on its existing technical platform, without having to understand and keep track of an
organization’s unique requirements and specific past customization. Substantive
customization also creates a dependent relationship, allowing the vendor to hold the
organization “economic hostage” in future negotiations (Williamson, 1985). The ability of
an organization to exit the outsourcing relationship, as a result, decreases because
premature termination under such a situation becomes economically undesirable due to
high switching costs (Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999).
Proposition 1a: Lower customization is positively associated
organization’s outsourcing flexibility in terms of robustness.

with

an

Proposition 1b: Lower customization is positively associated
organization’s outsourcing flexibility in terms of modifiability.

with

an

Proposition 1c: Lower customization is positively associated
organization’s outsourcing flexibility in terms of ease of exit.

with

an

Similarly, high process maturity facilitates the management of flexibility in an outsourcing
relationship. A mature process with established practices and parameterized variance
tends to be more robust to external disturbances, as the clarity of operational rules makes
it easy to adjust while remaining optimal. A well-understood process is also easier to
modify because the vendor can learn about process routines with less difficulty. The 1997
outsourcing deal between DuPont–CSC and Andersen Consulting (AC) is a case in point
(Lacity and Willcocks, 2001). Prior to outsourcing, DuPont’s IT department consciously
engaged in continuous improvement, significantly enhancing process maturity though
re-engineering, value-added refocusing, and eliminating redundancy. The considerable
process rationalization, standardization, and consolidation not only enabled more
competitive negotiation, but also paid off in speedier handling of service and change
requests that DuPont later enjoyed. In addition, greater process maturity also facilitates
knowledge exchange with outsourcing vendors, making it easier for a process to be
readily disconnected from an existing relationship and reconnected to a new one. In India,
IT processes with CMM (Capability Maturity Model) Level 5 certification are becoming so
common in the software outsourcing business that they are already showing sign of
commoditization (Davenport, 2005).
Proposition 2a: Higher process maturity is positively associated with an
organization’s outsourcing flexibility in terms of robustness.
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Proposition 2b: Higher process maturity is positively associated with an
organization’s outsourcing flexibility in terms of modifiability.
Proposition 2c: Higher process maturity is positively associated with an
organization’s outsourcing flexibility in terms of ease of exit.
In the same vein, a highly interoperable vendor infrastructure enhances the ability of an
outsourcing relationship to allow operational changes exceeding projected capacity
through its ready scalability, wide compatibility, and standard connectivity among
applications. Modifiability also improves. Change requests on existing applications may
be handled more quickly and easily, facilitated through the reusable and modular
architecture. Likewise, the effect of interoperability on ease of exit is expected to be
positive. Structured data connectivity and system compatibility reduce coordination costs
in exchanging information between partners (Chung et al., 2003). Vendors can be
changed more readily as interface linkages are re-established across various delivery
platforms (Alexander, 1995). An interoperable infrastructure, based on common technical
standards, thus improves an organization’s exit flexibility. Open EDI systems or
XML-based data interchanges, for example, facilitate coordination by reducing specificity
in outsourcing partners and broadening the pool of available vendors (Gosain et al., 2004;
Sanchez, 1995).
Proposition 3a: High vendor interoperability is positively associated with an
organization’s outsourcing flexibility in terms of robustness.
Proposition 3b: High vendor interoperability is positively associated with an
organization’s outsourcing flexibility in terms of modifiability.
Proposition 3c: High vendor interoperability is positively associated with an
organization’s outsourcing flexibility in terms of ease of exit.
Although the pre-emptive maneuvers of minimizing customization, enhancing process
maturity, and leveraging vendor interoperability improve outsourcing flexibility in terms of
robustness, modifiability, and ease of exit, we argue that such maneuvers do not
contribute to creating new capabilities. Arising from radical or “competence-destroying”
discontinuous changes, new capabilities are not simply service-line extensions,
geographic expansions, or technological improvements in the course of existing business
(Govindarajan and Trimbel, 2005); they depart significantly from the existing paradigm.
Actions and knowledge accumulated through current processes are likely to be irrelevant,
and loose coupling only enables adaptation within the context of the current system. To
develop new capabilities, a different form of strategic maneuver is needed.

Protective (Dependency Diversification) Maneuvers and Outsourcing
Flexibility
Although contracting with multiple outsourcing vendors reduces dependency and creates
competition among vendors, this mechanism is not without disadvantage. Gains from
enhanced bargaining power in an outsourcing relationship may be offset by coordination
costs and communication problems arising from managing a network of vendors. The
primary risk is the difficulty in managing the work and relationships with several suppliers
(Lacity et al., 1995). Cross (1995) examines this difficulty in the implementation of a
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“framework agreement” among suppliers in the outsourcing experience of British
Petroleum. A related problem is the diffusion of accountability and responsibility,
particularly if the sub-processes are highly interdependent (Loh and Venkatraman, 1992;
Huang et al., 2004).
Given the high costs typically associated with multiple sourcing, we argue that such
maneuvers are typically tapped not for routine operational issues (e.g., transaction
fluctuation), but only to provide fallback if there is a need to exit an outsourcing
arrangement. Resources spread across multiple vendors are generally passive, that is,
they are not available to one another. Such maneuvers are often advocated by
organizations to minimize switching costs, or as “exit strategies” (Emerson, 1962; Currie
and Willcocks, 1998; Lacity and Willcocks, 2001). For example, British Petroleum
allocated its upstream and downstream accounting processes to SEMA, Syncordia, and
SAIC, respectively. JP Morgan signed a seven-year US$2.1 billion contract with four
major suppliers. Competitive knowledge across multiple vendors enhanced both British
Petroleum’s and JP Morgan’s bargaining positions, and they avoided becoming
dependent upon a single supplier, having the alternatives to exit if necessary. Therefore,
we argue that multiple-sourcing maneuvers are not intended to augment outsourcing
flexibility in terms of robustness, modifiability, or new capability generation, given the
substantial coordination required. Rather, their primary focus is to gain ease of exit when
the need arises.
Proposition 4: Multiple sourcing is positively associated with an organization’s
outsourcing flexibility in terms of ease of exit.
Similar arguments apply to retaining in-house competence as a protective flexibility
maneuver. Given the high cost of redundancy, many organizations do not deploy purely
idle or slack resources (e.g., maintaining a dedicated hot site to back up a data center).
One cost-efficient practice is to segment a process into two logical sections, leaving a
team of in-house staff to perform one section while outsourcing the other. This
arrangement enables organizations to retain and continuously build process expertise
(Lacity and Willcocks, 2001). Important systems knowledge and IT competence do not
simply disappear when organizations switch vendors, or when vendors go bust. A large
bank in Singapore outsourced the non-sensitive part of its network maintenance to IBM
while keeping the sensitive network service in-house. Apart from security concerns, the
main reason for segmenting the process was to preserve internal competence to prepare
for unpredicted variations, and even back-sourcing in case of vendor non-performance.
Such resources are not idle (e.g., staff normally have other responsibilities), they remain
passive unless absolutely needed. They are activated as a last resort. Therefore, they
are considered as contingency measures for ease of exit, but do not contribute to
robustness, modifiability, or new capability generation.
Proposition 5: Retaining in-house competence is positively associated with an
organization’s outsourcing flexibility in terms of ease of exit.

Exploitive (Proactive Sensing) Maneuvers and Outsourcing Flexibility
Exploitive maneuvers aim to develop an organization’s ability to sense market uncertainty
in a rapidly changing environment. Proactive sensing in outsourcing management is
maintaining vigilance by constantly scanning the environment (e.g., the landscape of
outsourcing vendors’ market and potential leverage on novel technology) to anticipate the
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need to create or generate new capabilities. This requires strong managerial initiatives to
acquire external knowledge, the boldness to adopt best practices, and a willingness to
experiment with new ideas (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Teece et al., 1997).
Unlike retaining in-house competence, the strategic and external orientations of proactive
sensing maneuvers focus on information feedback outside routine operation, and hence,
they are not expected to affect robustness or modifiability. Organizations constantly scan,
assimilate, and leverage business intelligence to innovate, keep abreast with dynamics in
vendors’ markets (e.g., new and alternative vendors, new possibilities in offshoring or
opportunities for collaborative development), and quickly improvise and reconfigure their
operations to create new capabilities before others do. An organization’s ability to
anticipate and respond to radical change would thus depend on its management’s
proactive sensing capability. Such forward-looking knowledge (e.g., familiarity with a
vendor’s market, benchmarking of best practices) also keeps management vigilant about
the performance of outsourcing vendors. The heightened awareness of alternative
opportunities and management’s openness to assimilate new market practices will
enhance the ease of exit in an outsourcing relationship.
Proposition 6a: Proactive sensing is positively associated with an organization’s
outsourcing flexibility in terms of new capability.
Proposition 6b: Proactive sensing is positively associated with an organization’s
outsourcing flexibility in terms of ease of exit.

Corrective (Reactive Adaptation) Maneuvers and Outsourcing Flexibility
Since outsourcing involves repeated inter-organizational exchanges, a sound relationship
between an organization and its vendor is an important factor in an organization’s ability
to adapt (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). The argument is consistent with literature in
inter-organizational relationships indicating that a strong partnership has a positive
impact on an organization’s ability to adjust to changing environmental demands or
unintended problems (Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999). Rooted
in social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), such a relationship functions as a lubricant,
facilitating “on-the-fly” adaptation. A strong partnership with shared goals and mutual trust
induces the vendor to accommodate requests to cope with transactional fluctuations, to
modify existing operations, and to collaboratively create new capabilities spurred by
radical changes. The additional “give-and-take” efforts are seen by the vendor as
investments for longer term pay-offs as the partnership strengthens and reinforces itself
over time.
While partnership contributes to outsourcing flexibility in the traditional view of social
capital, the embedded mutual obligations of a cohesive partnership can also become a
liability, hindering an organization’s ability to pursue new opportunities outside the
relationship (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993). The expectation of continuity that
accompanies partnership tends to minimize parties’ motivation or preparation to exit an
outsourcing relationship (Gupta and Goyal, 1989; Kern and Blois, 2002). Thus, we argue
that strong partnership, as a corrective maneuver, enhances outsourcing flexibility in
terms of robustness, modifiability, and new capability, but inhibits ease of exit.
Pr0position 7a: Strong partnership is positively associated with an organization’s
outsourcing flexibility in terms of robustness
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Table 4. Strategic Maneuvers and Dimensions of Outsourcing Flexibility
Robustness
Modifiability
New capability

Minimize
customization

Enhance
process
maturity

(+)
• Standard process allows
organization to leverage
vendor’s economy of
scale/scope
• Standard process
reduces opportunistic
vendor behavior to hold
organization ransom for
process specificity
(+)
 Paramaterized process
enables easy scalability
 Well-defined process
facilitates routine
adjustment and knowledge
transfer

(+)
platform and
interface reduce
interdependence and
coordination costs
 Wider compatibility and
connectivity enable
process scability and
adaptability
 Common

Leverage
vendor interoperability

(+)
• Standard process reduces
the need for knowledge
exchange in modification
• Standard process reduces
opportunistic vendor
behavior to hold organization
ransom for process
specificity
(+)
 Well-documented

and
codified routines simplify
knowledge exchange
between parties
 Process rationalization,
standardization and
consolidation facilitate
modification of service
delivery
(+)
 Common platform and
interface simplify knowledge
exchange between parties
 Reusable and modular
architecture allows localized
reconfiguration and faciliates
functional add-ons

N/A
 Standard process is irrelevant
to new innovation or
out-of-the-box thinking in
“competence-destroying”
discontinuity

N/A
routines impose
knowledge inertia on process
change
 Knowledge about matured
process is irrelevant to new
innovation or out-of-the-box
thinking in
“competence-destroying”
discontinuity
N/A
 Vendor interoperability is
irrelevant to new innovation or
out-of-the-box thinking in
“competence-destroying”
discontinuity
 Accumulated

Ease of exit
(+)
process reduces
switching costs and speeds up
transition process
 Standard process reduces
opportunistic vendor behavior
to hold organization ransom for
process specificity
 Standard

(+)
defined process interface
enables loose coupling with
vendor operation
 Ease of knowledge transfer
enables nimble “unplug and
replug” in case of unfavorable
development
 Well

(+)
platform and
interface reduces specificity in
outsourcing partners and
broaden the pool of available
vendors.
 Common
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N/A
across
multiple vendors are
passive and not available
to one another for
operational fluctuations,
due to high coordination
costs
N/A
 Given the high cost of
dedicated redundancy,
in-house competence is a
passive resource for
operational fluctuations. It
is triggered only in extreme
situation of exiting
outsourcing
 Resources

Practice
multiple
sourcing

Retain
in-house
competency

N/A
strategic and
external orientations focus
on information feedback
outside routine operation;
hence, are not expected to
contribute to operatioinal
fluctuations
 The

Promote
proactive
sensing

(+)
Willingness to
accommodate operational
fluctuations or
transactional variations
based on shared goals and
mutual trust


Foster
partnership
quality
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N/A
across multiple
vendors are passive and not
available to one another for
service modifications, due to
high coordination costs
 Resources

N/A
Given the high cost of
dedicated redundancy,
in-house competence is a
passive resource for service
modifications. It is triggered
only in extreme situation of
exiting outsourcing


N/A
strategic and external
orientations focus on
information feedback outside
routine operation; hence, are
not expected to contribute to
service modifications
 The

(+)
Willingness to
accommodate requests for
modifications based on
shared goals and mutual
trust


N/A
across multiple
vendors are passive and not
available to one another for
“competence- destroying”
innovation or creation of new
capabilities, due to high
coordination costs
N/A
 Given the high cost of
dedicated redundancy,
in-house competence is a
passive resource for
“competence- destroying”
innovation or creation of new
capabilities. It is triggered only
in extreme situation of exiting
outsourcing
(+)
 Proactive sensing develops
organization alertness to new
opportunities and innovative
technologies
 Strategic, external, and open
mindset is conducive to
experimentation with new
ideas
 Resources

(+)
Willingness to accommodate
requests for new capability
based on shared goals and
mutual trust
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(+)
sourcing mitigates
resource dependency on single
vendor and reduces lock-in
hazard
 Competitive knowledge from
multiple sourcing augments
organization bargaining power
(+)
 In-house competency builds
up buffer mechanism to reduce
dependency, hence easing exit
in case of non-performance by
vendors
 Multiple

(+)
sensing keeps
management vigilant on
performance of outsourcing
vendor
 Proactive sensing enables
familiarity with vendor’s market
and awareness of alternative
opportunities, strengthening
readiness to exit.
(–)
 Relational investment leads to
expectation of business
continuty, reducing incentives
to exit
 Social embeddness increases
switching cost and inhibits the
parties from exiting
 Proactive
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Proposition 7b: Strong partnership is positively associated with an organization’s
outsourcing flexibility in terms of modifiability.
Proposition 7c: Strong partnership is positively associated with an organization’s
outsourcing flexibility in terms of new capability.
Proposition 7d: Strong partnership is negatively associated with an organization’s
outsourcing flexibility in terms of ease of exit.
Table 4 summarizes the series of our research propositions about the various strategic
maneuvers and the different dimensions of outsourcing flexibility.

Outsourcing Flexibility and Outsourcing Success
The above propositions highlight the different ways to achieve flexibility in outsourcing.
However, the impact of outsourcing flexibility on outsourcing success remains ambiguous.
Few formal outsourcing studies have empirically investigated their relationship (Clark et
al., 1995; Lacity and Willcocks, 2001). Indeed, the notion of flexibility is often
indiscriminately seen as a “good thing” in the outsourcing literature (Avison et al., 1995;
McFarlan and Nolan, 1995). Other studies simply include flexibility as one of a few
dimensions (e.g., as responsiveness) to measure outsourcing success, typically defined
as an organization’s satisfaction with benefits gained from outsourcing (e.g., Lee and Kim,
1999; Grover et al., 1996).
There have also been other related studies that explored the hypothesized negative
relationship between the level of environmental uncertainty and the outcome of
outsourcing (i.e., less successful outsourcing in volatile environments). However, the
findings are inconclusive (Dibbern et al., 2004). Wang (2002), following transaction cost
theory, finds a negative relationship between uncertainty and outsourcing success, but
Poppo and Zenger (1998) contradict this.
We would argue that a more complete view of the relationship between environmental
uncertainty and outsourcing success should consider the moderating impacts of the
flexibility attained through the strategic maneuvers that management puts in place.
Outsourcing success is less probable in a dynamic environment of high uncertainly, as
organizations have to constantly renegotiate with vendors to cope with the rapid and
unpredictable changes. The outsourcing flexibility achieved through the various strategic
maneuvers thus takes on special significance to avail alternative options or to buffer
against unfavorable situations.
These maneuvers are not free, however; they always involve additional costs, in
unnecessary complexity, excessive coordination, or idle resources. Instituting them can
thus be justified only when there is a strong need to manage risk and uncertainty. In times
of low turbulence, when demand and technology are relatively static, the premium on
outsourcing flexibility may be small. Uncertainty could have been foreseen and built into
the outsourcing contracts. Strategic maneuvers to achieve flexibility may therefore be
unnecessary, excessive, or even counterproductive because their costs outweigh their
benefits, eroding the economics of successful outsourcing. Thus, we would argue that
Proposition 8: Outsourcing flexibility moderates the negative relationship between
environmental uncertainty and outsourcing success, such that it enhances outsourcing
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success in times of high environmental uncertainty and erodes outsourcing success in
times of low environmental uncertainty.

Conclusions and Future Research
This paper extends existing outsourcing research along three main avenues. First,
integrating the various concepts of flexibility across multiple disciplines advances our
understanding of the dimensions of flexibility in outsourcing—that is, flexibility as
robustness, modifiability, new capability, and ease of exit. Second, recognizing that
contracts cannot adequately manage outsourcing flexibility by themselves, the paper
demonstrates how Evans’ (1991) archetypes of strategic maneuvers can be usefully
employed to frame the management of flexibility in an outsourcing relationship. By
minimizing customization, enhancing process maturity, and leveraging vendor
interoperability, organizations can consciously put in place pre-emptive maneuvers to
reduce tight coupling when responding to dynamic changes. Simultaneously, protective
maneuvers, such as sourcing from multiple vendors or retaining in-house competence,
can be planned up-front to back up outsourcing operations in extreme situations. An
organization is also not without options once an outsourcing contract is sealed. Exploitive
maneuvers can be instituted through proactive sensing to enhance management
alertness to take advantage of emerging changes and opportunities. Flexibility can also
be attained by strengthening an organization’s ability to adapt reactively, through a closer
partnership with outsourcing vendors.
Last but not least, we strive to populate this framework by consciously surfacing
maneuvers of flexibility management that have strong theoretical foundations and
empirical research in the outsourcing literature. We elaborate the characteristics of these
maneuvers, and put forth propositions about their relationships to different dimensions of
outsourcing flexibility. We also highlight that these strategic maneuvers are costly, and
suggest a positive moderating impact on outsourcing success only in high environmental
uncertainty.
As shown in Figure 3, the strategic maneuver framework thus provides a holistic view of
managing flexibility in outsourcing, enabling organizations to consider a portfolio of
maneuvers that best meets their needs.
Managers should consider the level of environmental uncertainty and clarify the
dimensions of flexibility they seek in an outsourcing relationship, as various maneuvers
contribute to each dimension differently. Minimizing customization and enhancing
process maturity, for example, are irrelevant to “out-of-the-box” thinking to develop new
capabilities in outsourcing. Similarly, while partnership quality enhances outsourcing
flexibility in terms of robustness, modifiability, and new capability, the social
embeddedness of a tight partnership diminishes an organization’s ease of exit.
We hope to set the stage for research on managing flexibility in outsourcing. In addition to
empirically validating the various research propositions, future research may also explore
the archetypes of strategic maneuvers as a portfolio, depending on some pertinent
contingencies. For example, contrasting the portfolio of maneuvers in outsourcing
between stable and dynamic business environments may tease out the relative
deployment of contractual provision, and the portfolio of pre-emptive, protective,
exploitive, and corrective maneuvers. Typically, in high-tech industries, the fast pace of
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Portfolio of Flexibility Maneuvers

Environmental
Uncertainty

Offensive
Pre-emptive Maneuvers

Exploitive Maneuvers

• Minimize customization • Promote Proactive
sensing
• Enhance process

Outsourcing
Flexibility

maturity

• Leverage on vendor
interoperability

P1-P7

Protective Maneuvers

Corrective Maneuvers

• Practice multiple

• Foster partnership

sourcing

• Robustness
• Modifiability
• New capability
• Ease of exit

P8

quality

• Retain in-house
competence

Outsourcing
Success
Defensive
Ex-ante

Ex-post

Figure 3. Research Model on Management of Outsourcing Flexibility
change may place a premium on exploitive maneuvers to proactively leverage emerging
opportunities; in stable industries, contractual provision or pre-emptive maneuvers are
fundamental to lay out or prepare for possible, and often predictable, alternatives.
Similarly, one would expect the portfolio of maneuvers to differ across business
processes with different degrees of structure (e.g., comparing different types of IT
outsourcing, or contrasting payroll outsourcing and financial advisory outsourcing).
Future research may also pursue the relationships among the strategic maneuvers to
achieve outsourcing flexibility. Although the hallmark of a flexible response is the
juxtaposition of several parallel actions, Evans (1991) also points out that ex ante
strategic postures (pre-emptive and protective maneuvers) must be in place for reactive
or responsive (exploitive and corrective) maneuvers to be successful. This suggests that
advanced structuring also affects the execution of ex post adjustments. Organizations
have limited capacity to adapt to changes after the fact, as earlier decisions can constrain
organizational discretion later. The structure of exploitive maneuvers, which the
outsourcing literature has largely overlooked, also deserves greater research attention.
Such proactive sensing to exploit uncertainty seems to synergize well with protective
maneuvers, as it could leverage common resources that build both in-house competence
and industry knowledge derived from multi-sourcing practices.
Finally, clarifying the various maneuvers allows us to see the value of IT to facilitate
flexibility management in outsourcing. Consistent with Boynton (1993), Quinn and Baily
(1994), and Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994), we believe that IT establishes an
inter-organizational business infrastructure that shapes a firm’s capacity to launch and
deliver various outsourced services. IT can enable external scanning, proactive sensing,
seamless communication in relationship building, and capturing or digitizing work
routines to enhance process maturity. Yet, as a delivery infrastructure, it has to be
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sufficiently flexible itself, that is, scalable, modular, and interoperable. Current research in
flexible IT infrastructure, such as service-oriented architecture (e.g., Brown and Hagel,
2003) and agile software development (e.g., Larmen, 2003), should lend important
perspectives to managing flexibility in outsourcing.
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